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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 84
ADMISSION OF "PALESTINE" AS A MEMBER OF A
SPECIALIZED AGENCY AND WITHHOLDING THE
PAYMENT OF ASSESSMENTS IN RESPONSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization, claiming to repre-
sent a new state of "Palestine," sought full membership in the World Health
Organization. The United States Government threatened to withhold its
assessed dues to the WHO if it admitted "Palestine," as represented by the
PLO, into its membership.' At its meeting later that month, the World
Health Assembly voted to defer the PLO's application for a year.2
The PLO has said that it will pursue its application not only to the WHO,
but also to such other specialized agencies as the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the International
Telecommunication Union, and UNESCO. 3 The United States is currently a
member of all of these agencies except UNESCO. It appears that the U.S.
Government is prepared to withhold all dues assessed to it by any specialized
agency of which it is a member, if the agency admits "Palestine" to full
•membership.'
This Editorial Comment addresses the questions whether "Palestine," as
represented by the PLO, is eligible for membership in the specialized agen-
cies, and whether U.S. withholding of all dues in response to Palestinian
membership would be permissible as a matter of international law, so long as
the United States remains a member of the organization from which the
funds are withheld. The Comment does not address the lawfulness of U.S.
withdrawal from these organizations. It should be noted, though, that if the
United States decided to withdraw from an organization that admitted
"Palestine"-an option that seems highly questionable as a matter of policy
if there were no other reason for a decision to withdraw-it would be bound
to follow the organization's established procedure for withdrawal. Insofar as
this involves a waiting period from the giving of notice until withdrawal is
effective, the United States during that period would remain a member with
the normal obligations-including any obligation of a member to pay dues.5
The constituent instruments of the specialized agencies define the qualifi-
cations of membership in differing terms.6 One constant for full member-
'See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, §1, at 5, col. 1.
2 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1989, at 3, col. 5.
' Wash. Post, May 11, 1989, at A36, col. 2.
1 As a practical matter, this issue will not arise in the United Nations itself. Under UN
Charter Article 4(2), as interpreted by the International Court ofJustice in Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 ICJ REP. 4
(Advisory Opinion of Mar. 3), a recommendation of the Security Council is required before the
General Assembly may admit a new member. Unless circumstances change substantially, the
United States presumably would veto any such recommendation involving the PLO.
' This is made explicit in the ILO Constitution, Article 1(5), during the 2-year waiting period
required by that article. It would also be the case in any other agency that requires advance
notice of intent to withdraw, since notice would not be equivalent to withdrawal.
6 Some provide for associate, as well as full, membership. This Comment is concerned only
with full membership, since that is what the PLO currently seeks.
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ship, though, is a form of international personality variously referred to in
the constituent instruments as "state," 7 "nation"' or "country." 9 Approval
for membership normally requires a two-thirds vote of the plenary body,
but only a simple majority is required by the WHO.'° In some agencies there
are procedural preconditions to the vote, such as screening by a committee
to determine the applicant's capacity to perform the obligations of mem-
bership. "
It is very doubtful that "Palestine" currently qualifies as a state under
international law. A recent definition of state, based on an older, widely
recognized definition, says: "Under international law, a state is an entity
that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control
of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in,
formal relations with other such entities.'
' 2
Even though the Palestine National Council has declared "the establish-
ment of the State of Palestine,"' 3 and even though many governments (the
exact number is unclear) have apparently recognized such a state, several
other governments have withheld recognition on the ground that "Pales-
tine" does not meet the conditions required to be a state. When the United
Nations General Assembly adopted its resolution on the "Question of
7 For example, the WHO Constitution provides, "Membership in the Organization shall be
open to all States." WHO Constitution,July 22, 1946, Art. 3, 62 Stat. 2679, TIAS No. 1808,
14 UNTS 185. The Constitution of the ILO provides for membership by states members on
Nov. 1, 1945, "and such other States as may become Members" under other paragraphs of
Article I. Constitution of the ILO, Oct. 9, 1946, Art. 1(2), 62 Stat. 3485, TIAS No. 1868, 15
UNTS 35. The Convention on International Civil Aviation defines ICAO membership in
terms limited to members of the United Nations and other "States." Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Arts. 91-93, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS No. 1591, 15 UNTS
295.
The FAO Constitution provides that the Conference may decide to admit "any nation
which has submitted an application for membership and a declaration made in a formal instru-
ment that it will accept the obligations of the Constitution as in force at the time of admission."
Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Oct. 16, 1945, Art.
11(2), 12 UST 980, TIAS No. 4803.
"The International Telecommunication Convention provides that membership in the ITU
is open to "any sovereign country" that is properly approved by the membership. International
Telecommunication Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, Art. l(1)(c), in G. WALLENSTEIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION AGREEMENTS, Binder *, pt. 3 (1985,. Membership in the
Universal Postal Union is also limited to "any sovereign country." Constitution of the Univer-
sal Postal Union, July 10, 1964, Art. 11(2), 16 UST 1291, TIAS No. 5881, 611 UNTS 7, as
,t, ndd Nov. 14, 1969, 22 UST 1056, TIAS No. 7150, 810 UNTS 7.
" WHO Constitution, supra note 7, Art. 6.
S,,, %g., Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference, Art. 28, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION
AND STANDING ORDERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 46 (1988). The ILO
screening is more than a formality. See Vignes, La Participation au_: organisations internationales,
in A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 57, 67 (R.-J. Dupuy ed. 1988).
"' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §201
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The definition is based on the Montevideo Con-
vention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, Art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, TS No. 881, 165
LNTS 19.
" Palestine National Council's Declaration of Independence, in UN Doc. A/43/827-S/
20278, Ann. III, at 15 (1988), reprinted in 27 ILM 1668, 1670 (1988).
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Palestine" in December 1988, it did not recognize a Palestinian state; nor
did it call the PLO a provisional government. Instead, it acknowledged that
the Palestine National Council had proclaimed the State of Palestine, af-
firmed the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise sovereignty
over the occupied territories, and changed the PLO's designation to "Pal-
estine" in the UN system.
14
If we leave aside the rather academic debate over the "constitutive" and
"declaratory" theories of recognition 5 and try to look objectively at only
one aspect of the situation, it is clear that the population within the present
territory of "Palestine," no matter how that territory may be defined, never
has been under the control of the PLO or of any other indigenous govern-
ment while the current claim of state status has been asserted. This alone
would deprive "Palestine" of current state status under traditional prin-
ciples.
1 6
Enough has been said to show that a credible challenge, at the very least,
may be made to the current claim of a Palestinian state. For the purposes of
this Comment, a firm conclusion on this point is necessary only if the eligibil-
ity of "Palestine" for membership in the specialized agencies, and the law-
fulness of the withholding of dues, turn on it. Obviously, if the challenge is
somehow unpersuasive and "Palestine" is actually a state, and if it is then
admitted by the proper procedure, dissenting members could not lawfully
withhold otherwise obligatory dues in protest. More credibly, the definition
of "state," "nation" or "country" in the constituent instrument of a special-
ized agency that admits "Palestine" might not be the same as the definition
of "state" in customary international law.' 7 In that case, a determination of
state status would be irrelevant.
It is not entirely fanciful to think that a "state" for purposes of admission
to a specialized agency might be something other than a "state" for pur-
poses of customary international law.'" It is generally left to each organ of an
intergovernmental organization to interpret those parts of the constituent
14 GA Res. 43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988), adopted by a vote of 104-2 (Israel, United States)-36,
with 15 member states absent and one (Iran) not participating in the vote. The General
Assembly took no vote in 1989 on a draft resolution that would have construed "Palestine" to
be the State of Palestine. The decision not to press for a vote occurred after the United States
threatened to withhold its dues. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at A3, col. 4.
5 
5
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, §201 Reporters' Note 1;J. CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-25 (1979).
'" Cf Italian Corte de cassazione decision ofJune 28, 1985, Re Arafat, 109 FORO ITALIANO
II, at 277 (1986), translated in part in 7 ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 295 (1986-87). But see Flory,
Naissance d'un Etat palestinien, 93 REVUE GN RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 385,
396-99 (1989); Quigley, Palestine's Declaratio, of hndependence: Self-Determination and the Right of
the Palestinians to Statehood, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 25-28 (1989).
17 Even where the applicant is required to be a "state," it does not inexorably follow that this
means the traditional definition of a state. The meaning of a term or concept in one context is
not necessarily its meaning in all contexts. For example, "treaty" has a narrower meaning in
U.S. constitutional law than it does in international law. Compare U.S. CONSr. Arts. II, §2, and
VI, with Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS
331, reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969).
'8 Cf D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 385 (4th ed. 1982).
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instrument that apply to its own functions, in the absence of an effective
request to an international tribunal or other body to render an authoritative
interpretation.' 9 If the entity seeking membership is required only to be a
"country," or even a "sovereign country," its eligibility probably would not
turn on its acquisition of all the elements of a "state" by any definition.2"
Even if "Palestine" need not meet the traditional requirements of a
"state" to be eligible for membership in a specialized agency, it does not
necessarily follow that it could lawfully be admitted. The specialized agen-
cies have functions to perform. They depend on their members to assist
them in the performance of those functions, or in some cases to carry out
the functions themselves. For a new member, to do so normally would
require at least some measure of control over the claimed territory and
population by the political body applying for membership in the name of the
new entity. To define an eligible entity as a "state," "nation" or "country"
is to imply this much, whether or not the definition calls for all the attributes
of a state. Thus, the new entity's eligibility would depend on its ability to
carry out-at least in substantial measure-the essential, ongoing obliga-
tions of membership.2' In the case of "Palestine," the PLO currently does
not have that ability.
Arguably, practice involving Namibia runs counter to the position taken
in the preceding paragraph. Preindependent Namibia, represented by the
United Nations Council for Namibia, was admitted as a full member of some
specialized agencies. But the juridical propriety of its admission is at least
questionable. In the ILO, Namibia was admitted despite an opinion from
the I LO Legal Adviser concluding that full membership would be improper
until Namibia became able to exercise all the rights and discharge all the
obligations of membership.22 The Legal Adviser relied particularly on the
Permanent Court of International Justice's opinion that the Free City of
" With respect to the United Nations itself, this appears clearly in the Report of the Rap-
porteur of Committee IV/2 at the San Francisco Conference, Doc. 933, IV/2/42, 13 UNCIO
Docs. 703, 709 (1945).
'" Se, Omeorogbe, Functionalisn in the UPU and the ITU, 27 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 50, 55, 60-61
(1987).
A' There has been debate about whether the United Nations has abandoned the express
condition in UN Charter Article 4(1) that applicant states be, in thejudgment of the Organiza-
tion, able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership. SeeJ. CRAWFORD, supra note
15, at 140. The debate has centered on the relatively recent practice of admitting microstates.
The question about their ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership has
revolved primarily around their ability to maintain military forces at the call of the Security
Council under chapter VII of the Charter. But the chapter VII obligations with which they
could not comply are dead letters.
The microentities that have been admitted to the United Nations are "states," no matter
how small. Se I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (3d ed. 1979).
They are capable of carrying out the principal, ongoing obligations of UN membership. Thus,
their admission to the United Nations does not imply abandonment (or nonexistence) of a
condition based on ability to participate in the fulfillment of an organization's purposes, if the
means of fulfilling the purposes are taken as they exist at the time of admission.
zz So, International Labour Conference, 64th Sess., Provisional Record of Proceedings
24/20, 24/21 (1978).
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Danzig was ineligible for ILO membership so long as the conduct of its
foreign relations was subject to the consent of the Government of Poland.
23
The Namibia precedent thus is not entirely convincing. Moreover, one
might distinguish it on the basis of the direct UN appointment of an admin-
istering body to take the place of a government authoritatively held by the
Security Council to have lost its legitimacy in the defined territory.24 This
action gave the General Assembly's request to the specialized agencies that
they grant full membership to the UN Council for Namibia25 a legal basis so
far unavailable in the case of "Palestine."
26
In any event, if the preindependent Namibia precedent is both applicable
and convincing, whether "Palestine" is a state becomes a moot point and the
withholding of dues would be improper. The real question is: if "Palestine"
is not eligible for membership (because it is not a "state" or because-not
needing to be a "state"-it is nevertheless incapable of carrying out the
obligations of membership), could the United States lawfully withhold all of
its assessed dues in response to a vote to admit "Palestine" as a full member?
If the answer is no, there is no scenario in which a firm conclusion regarding
the status of "Palestine" as a state would determine the withholding issue.
II. WITHHOLDING IF A NONSTATE IS IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED AS A FULL MEMBER
The Constituent Instrument and Treaty Law
The analysis must begin with the constituent instrument of the specialized
agency that admits "Palestine" to membership. If the instrument imposes
no duty to pay assessed dues, withholding for any reason short of bad faith
would be lawful. But the constituent instruments of the specialized agencies
typically do impose duties to pay dues.
For example, the WHO Constitution empowers the Health Assembly to
approve the budget and "apportion the expenses among the Members"; it
also refers to the members' "financial obligations" and provides a sanction
for failure to meet them.27 The FAO Constitution provides, "Each Member
Nation and Associate Member undertakes to contribute annually to the
Organization its share of the budget, as apportioned by the Conference."28
The ILO Constitution says that the "expenses of the [ILO] shall be borne by
the Members in accordance with the arrangements" established by the
25 Free City of Danzig and International Labour Organization, 1930 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 18
(Advisory Opinion of Aug. 26).
2 4 See GA Res. 2248, S-V GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 1, UN Doc. A/6657 (1967); SC Res. 276,
25 SCOR Res. & Dec. at 1, UN Doc. S/INF/25 (1970); Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ-REP. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
25 GA Res. 32/9E, 32 GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 19, UN Doc. A/32/45 (1978).
28 At this writing, the General Assembly had not made a similar request regarding "Pales-
tine." The point is that even if it does so, it would not have the same legal basis for its request as
it did with the Council for Namibia.
21 WHO Constitution, supra note 7, Arts. 7, 56.
28 FAO Constitution, supra note 8, Art. XVIII.
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Constitution, and imposes a sanction for failure to pay. 29 The International
Telecommunication Convention refers to members' "contributions," but
says that "Members shall pay in advance their annual contributory shares,
calculated on the basis of the budget approved by the Administrative
Council." 3 The Convention on International Civil Aviation authorizes the
ICAO Assembly to "apportion the expenses of the Organization among the
contracting States on the basis which it shall from time to time determine"
and provides a sanction for failure to pay."' Other examples could be given.
The question is thus one of possible excuse from a member state's interna-
tional obligation to pay assessed dues. There is an initial question of the
applicable source of international law. Although the specialized agencies'
constituent instruments are multilateral treaties, it is not clear that interna-
tional treaty law applies to the rights and duties of members when an organ
-as distinguished from a member or a group of members acting in a way
that does not purport to bind the organization-acts inconsistently with the
instrument. Instead, the source may be the constitutional or administrative
law of the organization, or of international organizations generally.
3 2
This problem, though, may be more conceptual than practical. It is rea-
sonably safe to assume that general sources of international law-such as
treaty law and the law of state responsibility-would apply by analogy even
if not directly, in the absence of applicable provisions on remedies in the
constituent instruments themselves."3 This Comment considers these
sources first, and then turns to an argument based on inherent powers of
members of international organizations.
One treaty law argument, based on Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, may be dismissed quickly. Article 62 permits a party
to suspend the operation of a treaty if there has been an unforeseen, funda-
mental change of circumstances that constituted an essential basis of the
parties' consent to be bound, and if the change radically transforms the
ILO Constitution, supra note 7, Art. 13(3) and (4).
-' International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 9, Art. 15(2) and (7).
' Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 7, Arts. 61, 62.
SSee Cahier, L'Ordrejuridique interne des organisations internationales, in A HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 11, at 237, 242-47; Zoller, The "Corporate Will"
,,f-the United Natzons and the Rights of the Minority, 81 AJIL 610, 630-34 (1987). In the first UN
admissions case, the International Court of Justice said, without identifying the source of law,
"The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty
provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria
for itsjudgment." Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), 1948 ICJ REP.
57, 64 (Advisory Opinion of May 28).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 17, Art. 5, says that it applies to any
treaty that is the constituent instrument of an international organization, "without prejudice to
any, relevant rules of the organization." The intent of Article 5 seems to be to regulate the
relations between states members of an organization, but not necessarily to regulate the inter-
nal law of organizations. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, UN Doc.
A/CONF.129/15, reprinted in 25 ILM 543 (1986), does not apply to the internal affairs of
international organizations.
' Cf. Zoller, supra note 32, at 630.
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extent of obligations still to be performed. Admission of "Palestine" to any
specialized agency would not radically transform the extent (or impact) of
other members' obligations. Even if it did, Article 62 does not contemplate
suspension of only a nonseparable part of a party's obligations. The obliga-
tion to pay assessed dues would not be separable from the remainder of the
constituent instrument.34 The United States thus could not rely on the
changed circumstances doctrine to withhold its dues.
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention sets forth remedies for material
breach of a treaty. As will be noted below, the remedies are rather limited in
the case of a multilateral treaty. But before one gets to remedies, one must
ask whether the breach in question is "material."
Vienna Convention Article 60(3)(b) defines material breach as "the vio-
lation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or pur-
pose of the treaty." A provision in a constituent instrument limiting eligibil-
ity for full membership to "states," "nations" or "countries" would be
essential to the accomplishment of the organization's purposes, if the pur-
poses require members to exercise national governmental functions. In the
case of the ILO, for example, a political entity lacking effective control over
a population and a territory would not be able to enact effective labor
legislation. Admission of an entity lacking these attributes of a state would
thus be inconsistent with an essential provision of the ILO Constitution, the
preindependent Namibia precedent to the contrary notwithstanding.
It does not necessarily follow that admission of such an entity would be a
material breach of an organization's constituent instrument. The breach in
the case of "Palestine" (as in the case of preindependent Namibia) would
involve the admission of a single nonstate having a plausible claim to even-
tual state status. Moreover, the Palestinian entity no longer declares that its
claim is tied to a threat or use of force against another state. 5 Consequently,
its admission to membership would be a relatively minor breach of the
essential provision, if we consider the breach only in terms of its effect on
the organization's ability to accomplish its purposes through such means (in
the case of the ILO) as the adoption and enforcement of labor legislation by
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 17, Art. 44.
s The declaration says that the "State of Palestine. . . rejects the threat or use of force,
violence and intimidation against its territorial integrity and political independence or those of
any other State." Palestine National Council's Declaration of Independence, supra note 13, at
16, 27 ILM at 1671. The declaration relies on GA Res. 181 (II), 2 GAOR Res. 131, UN Doc.
A/519 (1947), the General Assembly's partition resolution, for the legitimacy of the Arab
right to sovereignty and national independence in Palestine. The declaration thus recognizes
the partition of Palestine between an Arab and a Jewish state, but it does not assert that the
boundaries contemplated in the partition resolution have any current significance.
Yasir Arafat has acknowledged the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict,
including Israel, to exist in peace and security. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1988, at A19, col. 5
(transcript of Arafat statement).
Under Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; NZ v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253 and 457 (Judgments of
Dec. 20), unilateral declarations may create binding international obligations, at least if made
by, or on behalf of, the government of a state. If "Palestine" were recognized as a state, it is
likely that both the Palestine National Council's declaration and the Arafat statement would
meet the test of the Nuclear Tests cases.
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its membership. To consider the breach in terms of its possible effect on a
political situation outside the organization would be extraneous to the treaty
law issue. To consider the likely effect of the breach on the willingness of
individual members to pay their dues would be to beg the question.
The Vienna Convention does not on its face distinguish between signifi-
cant and insignificant violations of essential treaty provisions. Respect for
the efficient operation of treaty regimes, however, suggests that relatively
isolated departures from the strictures of even an essential provision are not
material breaches if they do not threaten to defeat the purpose of the treaty.
The negotiating history of Article 60 tends to support this proposition.3 6 It
is a particularly compelling proposition when the treaty regime takes the
form of an international organization serving the needs of humankind.
Article 60 thus would not seem to justify the withholding of dues as a
response to Palestinian membership in an organization that can accomplish
its purposes even with such a nonstate in its midst.
If, contrary to what has just been said, admission of "Palestine" to full
membership would be a material breach of a particular constituent instru-
ment, the United States still could not invoke it under the Vienna Conven-
tion as a ground for withholding dues. Vienna Convention Article 60(2)(b)
permits "a party specially affected by the breach" to invoke it as a ground
for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations
between itself and the defaulting party.3 7 This formulation represents a
narrowing of a draft article that would have authorized any party to invoke
material breach as a ground for suspension between itself and the defaulting
party." The United States proposed the narrower language, apparently out
of concern that the right to invoke a breach for suspension of obligations
could otherwise be abused by a party anxious to find a pretext for suspend-
ing the operation of a treaty against an offending state. 9
The examples the United States gave of a party adversely affected by a
breach involved breaches directed specifically at that party.4" Admission of
"Palestine" as a member of a specialized agency would not be an act di-
rected specifically at the United States; nor would U.S. rights or obligations
under a constituent instrument be affected any more (or less) than those of
other member states. It is irrelevant that the United States has more strenu-
ous objections than most other states, under present circumstances, to any
action that could tend to legitimize the Palestinian claims.
For discussion of the negotiating history, see Kirgis, Some Lingering Questions About Article
60 ,,f ti, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 549, 550-55 (1989).
A,7 rticle 60(2)(c) gives another ground for suspension, but it applies when the treaty is of
such a character that a material breach of one of its provisions radically changes the position of
every party, with respect to further performance of its obligations. It would be far-fetched to
argue that admission to a specialized agency of "Palestine," under PLO auspices, radically
changes the position of all members in the manner specified.
" S, Sir Humphrey Waldock's Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. CONIM'N 36, 73, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1.
",, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 34-36, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
"' Id at 35.
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If, contrary to all that has been said so far, admission of "Palestine" would
be a material breach and the United States a party specially affected by it,
the Vienna Convention still would not authorize an unrestrained unilateral
response. A restriction arises from the law of state responsibility, in particu-
lar the law of reprisal, which applies to the action a state party to a treaty
may take in response to either a material or a nonmaterial breach.4' Proce-
dural requirements under the Vienna Convention, as well as under the law
of reprisal, do not seem to pose a serious problem. They act as a surrogate in
a case like this for the requirement that unilateral disregard of an otherwise
applicable duty be "necessary" under the circumstances. Negotiations pre-
ceding a vote on admission of a new member would satisfy the spirit, if not
always the letter, of any procedural requirements in the Vienna Convention
or the law of reprisal.4" But under the law of reprisal, the response neverthe-
less could not be manifestly disproportional to the breach.43 As described by
one prominent commentator, "the importance of the rule disregarded [in
reprisal] as well as the duration and global effects of its non-application
should roughly correspond to those of the unlawful act to which one re-
taliates."44
In the normal law of reprisal between states, a countermeasure is not
manifestly disproportional just because it exceeds the breach in intensity by
enough to provide some measure of deterrence against repeated or similar
breaches.45 It does not necessarily follow that the proportionality principle
would be equally flexible when applied to reprisals against international
organizations. But even if it is, withholding the full amount of a U.S. assess-
ment that constitutes 25 percent of the budget of an organization, as is the
case in many specialized agencies, would be manifestly out of proportion to
a breach that would not significantly increase the burdens of membership or
41 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 17, Art. 73; Kirgis, supra note
36, at 559, 567.
42 The procedural duty to attempt dispute settlement appears in Vienna Convention Arts. 65
and 66. Since the Vienna Convention would be applied only by analogy, however, its purely
procedural provisions might not bind states responding to a breach by an organ of a specialized
agency. Even though the law of reprisal supplies a similar procedural duty when one state
contemplates a reprisal against another, in the instance addressed in this report-admission of
a new member into an international organization-there will have been negotiation and de-
bate before a vote is taken. Thus, a traditional form of dispute settlement will have transpired,
in the only forum to which the aggrieved state has ready access.
The caveat is that the aggrieved state could, and perhaps should, try to persuade the appro-
priate organ to seek an ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of admitting "Palestine." The UN
General Assembly, acting under UN Charter Article 96(2), has authorized the specialized
agencies to request ICJ advisory opinions on legal questions within the scope of their activities.
4 See Willem Riphagen's Sixth Report on State Responsibility, [1985] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, Pt. 1 at 3, 11, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (pt. 1). See also Naulilaa
Incident Arbitration (Port./Ger.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1012 (1928), summarized in 6 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-55 (1943).
44 A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 244 (paperback ed. 1988).
4' Air Service Agreement Award (U.S.-Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 417, 443-44 (1978), 54
ILR 304, 338 (1979). See Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 178-79 (1982 V).
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go very far toward defeating accomplishment of the organization's goals.
The impact of a zero payment by the United States would not seem to
correspond with the effect within the organization of the irregular or un-
lawful act admitting "Palestine" to membership, even if we allow some
leeway for deterrence against similar acts by other organizations.
If admission of "Palestine" to membership is a breach of the constituent
instrument but is not a material breach within the meaning of Vienna
Convention Article 60, the law of state responsibility would apply wholly
apart from the law of treaties.46 The principal issue would be rough propor-
tionality, as discussed above.47 The argument against full withholding would
be equally strong.
Customary International Law and Recognition of States
It is necessary at this point to consider yet another line of argument. If
there is a duty under customary international law to refrain from ascribing
the status of a state to entities that do not qualify as states, if that duty applies
to international organizations, and if an organization violates it by explicitly
or implicitly recognizing "Palestine" as a state,48 the reprisal/proportional-
ity argument would not necessarily be the same as has been outlined above.
The analysis might no longer consider only the rough proportionality of full
withholding as against the impact of the breach within an organizational
structure; that is, the proportionality analysis would not necessarily be lim-
ited to relations within a regime created by a single treaty-the organiza-
tion's constituent instrument-or within a series of similar regimes estab-
lished by the constituent instruments of all organizations that might admit
"Palestine." Instead, the analysis might weigh full withholding of dues
against the impact that recognizing a Palestinian state would have on world
order, or at least on the maintenance of order in the Middle East.
Such an analysis would be exceedingly difficult to make in a way that
would convince parties on both sides of the Palestine conflict. Fortunately, it
is not necessary to make it. The reason is that there appears to be no duty
under customary international law to refrain from treating a nonstate politi-
cal entity as though it were a state. If there is no such duty, a right of reprisal
does not arise.
4"'S,, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 17, Art. 73; Schachter, supra
note 45, at 175; Kirgis, supra note 36, at 571-72.
17 On the question whether the United States would be an aggrieved state, the analysis would
be somewhat different when it does not deal with Vienna Convention Article 60. When there is
a material breach of a multilateral treaty, Vienna Convention Article 60(2)(b) and (c) would
circumscribe the universe of aggrieved states. When the breach is not material, the law of
reprisal recognizes, without clearly defining, some norms whose violation is erga omnes. Cf
Schachter, supra note 45, at 182-83. The violation of a norm limiting membership in an
organization to "states" could be in a sense erga onnes, defining the universe of aggrieved states
as all members of the organization that did not vote for admission of the nonstate.
" The mere admission of "Palestine," even in an organization limited to "states," would not
necessarily imply recognition of a Palestinian state under general international law. See text at
note 17 wupra.
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The leading work on the attributes of the state in international law treats
as a nonissue the recognition of nonstate entities as states.49 This passage
appears in the context of recognition among states, not recognition by an
international organization. But the only relevant difference as regards an
international organization would be that it is constrained legally by a treaty
-its constituent instrument. This Comment has already disposed of the
questions raised by violation by an organization of its constituent instru-
ment. That brings us back to nontreaty law, where there is no reason to
transform a nonissue for states into an issue for international organi-
zations.5°
Moreover, there is some practice by international organizations of admit-
ting nonstates despite "state" requirements in their constituent instruments.
I have already mentioned the Namibia example, involving some of the
specialized agencies.5 ' But the leading example, of course, is the United
Nations itself. The UN Charter clearly restricts membership to "states."
52
Six of its original members were not fully independent states in 1945." Of
these, Byelorussia and the Ukraine were not even putative states. It is argu-
able that some members admitted later were not yet states, as a matter of
customary international law, when they were admitted.54 Nevertheless,
there has been no serious assertion that the United Nations or the special-
ized agencies violated customary international law by admitting any of these
entities.
It is arguable, also, that an international organization of states does not
recognize state status simply by admitting an entity to membership, even if
the traditional concept of that status is the relevant condition for member-
ship. The argument has been made regarding admission to the United
Nations, though at least one prominent commentator disagrees.5 Of
course, admission to the United Nations means that the applicant has
avoided a veto by any of the five permanent members of the Security
Council. The veto, as a check against precipitate General Assembly action,
gives admission to the United Nations particular significance. If, then, ad-
mission to the United Nations does not imply recognition as a state, even less
49j. CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 35.
10 The one context in which recognition as a state may raise an issue under customary
international law is this: "A state has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity
that has attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force in
violation of the United Nations Charter." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, §202(2).
This obligation could apply also to an international organization. Although the PLO may well
have used force on a number of occasions in violation of principles of peaceful dispute settle-
ment contained in the Charter, those efforts have had limited success. Of course, it is a premise
of this Comment that "Palestine" might be admitted to an international organization even
though it has not attained the qualifications of a state.
51 See text at note 22 supra. 52 UN CHARTER Arts. 3 and 4.
s Byelorussia, the Ukraine, India, the Philippines, Lebanon and Syria. See J. DUGARD,
RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 53 (1987).
54 See id. at 60-74.
" See id. at 41-80. Dugard concludes after an examination of UN practice that "admission to
the United Nations constitutes or confirms the existence of a State." Id at 79. See also M.
TANDON, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (10th ed. 1965).
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would admission to a specialized agency where no veto applies. And even if
admission to the United Nations does imply recognition as a state, it would
not follow that admission to a specialized agency has the same effect.
6
The Inherent Power Argument
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether a member has a power inherent
in the law of international institutions to withhold dues when a plenary
body, acting in violation of the institution's constituent instrument, admits a
nonstate as a new member. It has been argued that there is an inherent, or
implied, power to withhold payment of assessments, but only when it is
indispensable to ensure strict compliance with the organization's undertak-
ing to observe the original intent of its charter.57 There has been no au-
thoritative decision upholding such a power.58 If it exists, it is a power that
would be triggered, of course, by a subjective judgment about the lawful-
ness of the plenary body's decision. A dispassionate third-party adjudicator
might not always agree with that judgment. Moreover, even when the judg-
ment is correct, the power it bestows would be effective only in the hands of
the powerful. If international law is to serve as an equalizing instrument
rather than simply as a tool of the mighty, we should be slow to find powers,
not supported by express agreement or by state practice, that can effectively
be wielded only by the well endowed.
Let us nevertheless assume that this power exists. I have already argued
that admission of "Palestine" under current circumstances would be incon-
sistent with most or all specialized agencies' constituent instruments. Argu-
ably, some form of withholding would then be indispensable-or at least
highly effective-in ensuring that these agencies uphold the intent of their
charters (since lesser countermeasures, such as refusing to deal with the
PLO within the agency, would be ineffective). Even so, such an inherent
power would be limited. Since the reason for the power would be quite
similar to the reason for allowing interstate reprisals, one would expect
limits on the power much like those on reprisals. This means that rough
proportionality would be required. To exercise an inherent power in a way
that would bring an organization to its knees-as would happen if 25 per-
cent of the budget were withheld from an organization using its money
efficiently and in accordance with its purposes-surely would exceed the
limits of rough proportionality under the circumstances considered in this
Comment.
" So, text at note 17 supra. This would be so, a fortiori, if the applicant need only be a
"country," or even a "sovereign country," under the specialized agency's constituent instru-
ment.
17 Zoller, supra note 32, at 632.
" Perhaps the closest thing to an authoritative decision on this point would be Judge Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice's individual opinion in Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 ICJ
REP. 151, 203-05 (Advisory Opinion of July 20). But he was referring to a right to withhold
payment of expenses assessed in violation of the constituent instrument. That is not the case at
hand.
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III. CONCLUSION
"Palestine" does not appear to qualify as a "state" under customary
international law. That does not necessarily determine its eligibility for
admission to the specialized agencies. But even if a nonstate would be eligi-
ble under some circumstances, "Palestine" does not seem to qualify with
respect to any agency that relies on its members' exercise of essentially
governmental powers. The reason is that the body claiming to represent it is
currently unable to fulfill the obligations of membership in any specialized
agency of that kind.
Nevertheless, there is no persuasive argument that the full withholding of
otherwise obligatory U.S. dues would be an internationally lawful response
to a specialized agency's decision to admit "Palestine" to regular member-
ship, even if the decision is inconsistent with the agency's own constituent
instrument. This is so, whether one considers it as a matter of treaty law,
customary law or inherent powers of international organizations.
I do not mean to say that there could be no case in which withholding of
dues-perhaps even the full withholding of dues-would be justified. But I
do say that the admission of a single ineligible entity, even one in as volatile a
setting as "Palestine," would not justify the full withholding of dues by a
member whose financial support is crucial to the functioning of the organi-
zation.
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.*
* This Comment is based on a report prepared by the author for the American Society of
International Law's Committee on UN Relations. Neither the Comment nor the report neces-
sarily reflects the views of the Society or of the committee.
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